تسمية الأشياء بأسمائها

Calling Things by Their Name

The current polarization in Lebanon cannot be limited to the proclaimed political disagreements — be they on the international tribunal pursuing the Harriri assassination, or on the makeup of a national unity government, or on the extent to which local parties are goaded by external and regional forces. These should all be read as a cipher, for us to decode the underlying socio-economic conflicts in relation to the various confessional communities. Not only because politics in Lebanon has become inextricably tied to the confessional system, but also because the two opposite camps have markedly different confessional compositions.

Whereas the weight of the Maronite community is about equal in both camps, the vast majority of the Shia community (represented by Hizbullah and Amal) support the March 8 coalition, and the vast majority of the Sunni and Druze communities support the March 14 coalition.

The March 8 coalition wants changes in government and national policies, the March 14 coalition is opposed. The side demanding changes include two mass movements that are relative newcomers to the fray of Lebanese politics: Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement (the latter led by former army general Michel Aoun). Both of these movements were marginalized or kept away from politics during the time of Syrian domination in Lebanon, in the years following the Taif Accord of 1989. During that time, while the FPM was excluded from politics by the forced exile of its leaders or by internal repression, Hizbullah was almost entirely engaged in resisting Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon. This marginalization had similar implications on the social makeup of both movements, as they both drew their support from segments of an emerging middle class and from inhabitants of disfavored suburbs surrounding the capital. Both parties thus drew closer as their constituencies had been largely kept away from government institutions and the civil service, and both had mostly drawn their livelihood from the private sector of the economy.

This has been the foundation of the alliance between Hizbullah and the FPM, which are now united in their demand for a bigger role in national affairs, as they both call for a national unity government in which they together control a blocking third of the ministerial seats. This demand from the FPM for a larger share in power responds to a profound desire among many Christian sectors to reverse the marginalization they have endured since the years of Syrian domination. The same demand from Hizbullah is a means to shield itself from various political plans to disarm it and diminish it after Israel’s massive military onslaught in July-August 2006 failed to achieve the same goals. Both the FPM and Hizbullah now insist on their right to be at the center of the executive branch, as the latter will determine in coming months conditions under which a new electoral law will be enacted and and a new president of the republic elected.

The Taif Accord of 1989 redistributed power among the three top positions in the confessional setup, namely, those of the president of the republic (Maronite), the prime minister (Sunni) and the speaker of parliament (Shiite). While restoring some of what the presidency lost after the Taif Accord, and with it bringing a sense of Christian empowerment, will have to await a new electoral law and the next presidential elections in November 2007, the current contest on the distribution of ministerial posts between the two opposite camps will affect immediately the balance between the three centers of power in the confessional setup. The issue of the “blocking third” did not raise much of a debate before the May 2005 parliamentary elections; consisting of ministers allied to the presidency, the “blocking third” was considered a measure accorded to the president to compensate for his curtailed power after the Taif Accord, as the council of ministers practically became the main framework within which he could exercise his prerogatives. In the current crisis, however, granting a “blocking third” to Hizbullah and its allies may introduce a new element in the confessional power-sharing formula, namely, it will give more weight to the Shia community within the council of ministers, hitherto considered a preserve for Sunni political influence.

Regardless of how much the preceding is a factor in causing it, the current political crisis cannot be resolved by simply inviting ministers affiliated with the March 8 coalition to rejoin their posts — and then insisting that it will be “business as usual” in government affairs. While the two sides raise the stakes in their declarations and denunciations of each other, they naturally compete in repudiating any hint of civil strife and inviting everyone to bury the idea, as if it is merely a contest of slogans and public pronouncements.

What is particularly worrisome in all of this is that the confessional system has reasserted itself anew as a regime of obstruction and gridlock. It has frustrated the different confessional groups partaking in it, thus encouraging them to bypass or finagle the Taif Accord and the constitution, while they all proclaim their commitment to both and compete in denying the need for any changes in either.

The confessional system has shown once more the extent to which it is divorced from ordinary people’s concerns. It forces people to squeeze out their rights — if it accords them such rights at all — through the pinholes of their confessional affiliations. It is a system where confessional leaders, whose function in times past was to distribute benefits and services to their respective communities, are now in effect left to distribute the debts of a stagnant and heavily indebted national economy.

Something has to give. The deadlock has to be broken. In the past, the Lebanese polity solved its crises by removing people through internal killing or forced emigration, or else by having besieged internal parties impose themselves through force of arms and recourse to their external allies. Will the current crisis be resolved in the same way? Do we change the system of government or do we change the people it governs? This is the fundamental question. And only by addressing it squarely can a dialogue between Lebanese parties prevent the catastrophe.