Lebanon in the Middle East Peace Talks: Player or Bargaining Card?
Fawwaz Traboulsi
Lebanon is the only Arab party participating in the Middle East peace process without the cover of the UN Security Council resolution 425 which stipulates the unconditional Israeli withdrawal from its territories occupied since 1978. Despite constant demands from the Lebanese government to that effect, the presidents of the USA and the ex-USSR made no mention of it in their letter of invitation to the Madrid conference. To understand why this has happened and what consequences it might have on the peace process, it will perhaps help to look at two features of the recent Lebanese developments.
‘The longest war’
Since 1968, Lebanon has been the scene of the longest Arab war with Israel. The toll can be imagined if to it is added the horrors and devastation of a16 years civil war. Two major invasions are but additional landmarks. Operation Litani, in 1978, pushed up PLO guerilla bases and fighters north of the Litani river, established a10 kilometers-deep occupied zone alongside the Israeli-Lebanese borders and set up a surrogate militia, the Army of Southern Lebanon (ASL). In June 1982, the more massive Israeli invasion which aimed at the demolition of the PLO infrastructure, reached its climax with a three-months siege, and the eventual occupation, of Beirut. It led to the withdrawal of PLO troops from the Lebanese capital in August just to be followed by the massacres of the Sabra and Chatilla Palestinian camps perpetrated by Phalangist militiamen with Israeli complicity.
A radically new situation arose in which the Lebanese themselves began resisting what became an Israeli occupation of their land. Initially. The resistance was launched by the leftist Lebanese Resistance Front (LRF) but was soon joined by other parties of the National Lebanese Movement (NLM), the chiite militia Amal and the Islamic Resistance, prominent among which is the pro-Iranian Hizbollah. Commando operations against Israeli troops all over the country soon triggered, and merged with, a massive popular intifadah- often referred to as the ‘revolt of the villages’- in the South and the Biqa` throughout the years 1983-1985. The high toll of casualties suffered by the IDF- estimated at more than five hundred soldiers killed in action- was a prime factor in bringing about Israel’s withdrawal from parts of Southern Lebanon and the western Biqa` in February-March 1985 not without adding to their ‘security zone’ an enclave in the Jezzin region (thirty kilometers away from the borders).
With this withdrawal the Israeli’s attempts to impose their will on the Lebanese ‘centre’ ended with a series of setbacks: the death of their imposed President-elect, Bachir Gemayel, assassinated before he even took office; the Jewish state’s attempts at playing off the Christian Lebanese Forces and the Druzes of Walid Junblatt one against the other brought about the expulsion of the Lebanese Forces from the Aley and Chouf districts and with them most of their Christian inhabitants; and, last but not least, Israel’s failure to impose the May17th 1983 agreement it concluded with the Lebanese government of Amine Gemayel in the face of sizeable internal and Arab opposition…
The Condominium
Very little can be understood in the situation in Lebanon without reference to the condominium that Syria and Israel came to exercise on the country, diligently and shrewdly mediated and orchestrated by the US administration since the Syrian military intervention in the Lebanese civil war in the summer of 1976. Thus Lebanon progressively became the arena where a complicated network of US controlled or mediated ‘low-intensity conflicts’ and ententes (especially against the PLO) between the two regional superpowers. Each party took turn in trying to become the sole hegemonic power or at least extend its sphere of influence beyond the famous ‘red lines’ assigned to it, be they defined in terms of armament or in terms of the area covered by its troops.
The above-mentioned political setbacks suffered by Israel were so many successes for Syria. By the end1987, the Syrian army had returned to western Beirut and to most of the areas it had been previously driven out from during the 1982 Israeli invasion. Further, the Syrian government’s allignement with the Allied Forces in the Gulf War won it the American ‘green light’ to put an end to the rebellion of General Michel Awn in October 1990. By virtue of the Taef Accord of October 1989 , the Treaty of Fraternity, Collaboration and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon of May 1991 and the September 1991 defense agreement between the two countries, Syrian presence and role were legally codified. While the Taef Accord stipulates that the Syrian troops withdraw to the Biqa` by September 1992, there are no provisions concerning the next phase. And a big question remains as to whether this withdrawal will take place on time and the parliamentary elections organised in a manner which helps the Lebanese freely chose their representatives.
Whatever the case, the Lebanese civil war came to an end with a new configuration which was eloquently summed up by Ghazi Kanaan, head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, on the eve of the signing of the Bilateral Treaty in May 1991: let the Lebanese engage in trade, finance, light industry and the likes; but let them leave politics and security matters to their Syrian brethren. This requires one qualification: the upholders of politics and security are also active participants in Lebanese economic activity and levy heavily on it!!
What’s on the agenda?
A Syrian-biased condominium seems to be the outcome of these long years, creating a situation which Israel seeks to subvert by its military strength and the favorable results of the Gulf War, and, last but not least, US complicity. How does that affect the course of the peace talks?
Despite the fact that Israel politicians pretend that their country have no territorial claims in Lebanon, there has been no limits to the number of conditions they have advanced to delay their withdrawal from Lebanese territory and even render it impossible. The arguments revolve around i) the garantees to the security of Israel’s northern frontiers, ii) the force capable of implementing these garantees and the iii) the fate of Israel’s surrogate, the ASL.
The traditional argument linked the withdrawal to the necessity of adequate security arrangements for Isreal’s northern borders. Now, we hear such announcements that Israel would not withdraw from the ‘security zone’ or let the Lebanese Army deploy in the South as long as “alien currents still influence the Lebanese”, to quote Brig.-General Micha Tamir, Israel’s liaison officer in Lebanon. He further insisted that the ASL should form the nucleus of the Lebanese Army which will enter the South.[1] Further, Israeli officials still reject the deployment of the Lebanese Army’s troops in the South, even in the Jezzin enclave which is no part of the ‘security zone’. First claiming that this deployment should come after disarming Palestinian guerillas, when these were finally disarmed, the Israeli argument shifted to demand the disarming of the Lebanese resistants and their expulsion from the South altogether. To this the Lebanese government and the majority of the Lebanese public opinion reply by asserting the right of every people to resist occupation of its occupied teritory. Another force that can that meet the garantees requirements is the the UNIFIL, set up by virtue of UN SC resolution 426 with the purpose of supervising Israeli withdrawal. If reinforced, is could be an adequate tool for meeting the famous ‘security’ requirements. But as yet, US and Israeli objections to it playing that role have been unsurmountable.
While the question of withdrawal remains the main bone of contention on the agenda, there are nevertheless other issues worth mentioning : i) annexed territories and unilateral modifications of frontiers: Lebanon claims nine villages annexed by Israel in1949. After its1982 invasion, the Jewish state annexed large areas of land, including a number of villages, in the Shib`a region, which led to the expulsion of thousands of villagers. Finally, the Lebanese-Israeli borders, defined by the1949 Armistice Agreement, and internationally recognised, are being pushed northwards by 500-1000 metres in Kafar Kala and Naqurah, and by 2-5 kilometres in the Wazzani and Tall al-Nuhas regions; and military roads being built along the frontier and across it…
ii) Water: Israel now controls all the affluents of the Jordan river: the Hasbani (Lebanon) the Banyas (Syria) and the Dan (controlled since1949 after the annexation of the above-mentioned Lebanese villages). Since its presence in South Lebanon, an estimated 320 millions cubic metres have been pumped by Israel from the Hasbani-Wazzani rivers and the exploitation of the underground water table is under way in the ‘security zone’. Lebanon is the only country concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, to have a river running entirely on its territory: the Litani. Despite the fact that there are no confirmed reports that Israel has been pumping the Litani river waters, there has always been Zionist and Israeli claims to this river, considered as being part of the Jordan water system. For decades, the Litani river figured in all the Israeli plans concerning water-sharing in the region. In all cases, Lebanon’s right to a river running inside its borders can with great difficulty be put for bargaining, not to speak of the fact that the country itself suffers extreme water shortages.
iii) the Palestinians in Lebanon: On May 21, 1987, the Lebanese parliament revoked the Cairo agreement of1969 which, among other things, recognised the PLO’s right to run the affairs of Lebanon’s Palestinians and represent them vis-à-vis the Lebanese State. Since July of last year, the PLO has been deprived of autonomous military presence in the last of its strongholds in the camps of Southern Lebanon in conformity with the Taef Agreement’s decision to disarm all militias on Lebanese territory. This leaves the more than 300 000 Palestinians of Lebanon without any legal status and with scantly any means to defend their rights. If this issue does not fall directly on the agenda ot the Lebanese-Israeli bilateral talks, it opens wide the whole issue of the fate of that part of the Palestinian people who are not included in the bilateral talks on Gazza and the West Bank. What use do peace talks serve if they cannot find an adequate and just solution for the plight of those initial victims of the emergence of the state of Israel?
In brief, US policy seems to attempt to strike a balance between two accords that each of the condominium partners achieved in the zenith of its strength namely: the Taef Accord which stipulates the application of UN SC resolution 425 and the text of the defunct 17th of May 1983 agreement which the Israeli negotiators want to revive.
As for the Lebanese, just awakening to the horrors of sixteen years of war, not daring hope that it finally came to an end, and full of questions and anxiety regarding the future, it could be said that a majority of them are eager to see both Israeli and Syrian troops leave their country. But a good many would at the same time give priority to the Israeli withdrawal and make a distinction between an occupying power and the more complex Syrian-Lebanese relations. The geographic, historic and national bonds that tie the two peoples, and which Lebanese rulers have so long ignored or mishandled, need to be organised but not necessarily in terms of the present hegemony. But the Syrian presence still benefits from the role it played in putting an end to the civil war and disarming the militias. What the Lebanese fear most is that their country rather than being an actor in the peace talks would be reduced to a bargaining card between the two partners of the condominium. An intolerable situation if added to all the difficulties of establishing internal peace and rebuilding the country.
Israeli commentators constantly allude to a package deal embracing both the Golan and South Lebanon. Writes Avi Benayahu [2]: “Given a situation in which Syria wishes to control parts of South Lebanon, it is possible to envisage security arrangements which permit a continued Israeli presence in the Golan Heights, in return for Israeli concessions in the Jezzin enclave and the ‘security zone’, provided there is a Syrian commitment to prevent terror from these areas”. The proposition is shrewd because it works both ways: it can easily imply the reverse: concessions should be given to Israel in Southern Lebanon if Syria is to expect to get anything in the Golan!
Fawwaz Traboulsi, journalist and writer from Lebanon, is presently a Senior Associate Member at St. Antony’s College-Oxford.