{"id":202,"date":"2007-04-26T21:59:24","date_gmt":"2007-04-26T18:59:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/fawwaztraboulsi.com\/?p=202"},"modified":"2025-03-03T10:11:17","modified_gmt":"2025-03-03T08:11:17","slug":"the-political-economy-of-militia-control-brown-university","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/the-political-economy-of-militia-control-brown-university\/","title":{"rendered":"The Political Economy of Militia Control – Brown University"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Political Economy of Militia Control<\/strong><\/p>\n

Brown University, 26 April 2007<\/strong><\/p>\n

It has been said that wars have no sense but functions. In fulfilling a series of extra-military functions, the Lebanese civil war created its own order, an order that was a monstrous mutation of its pre-war political and economic system: the autonomy of the sects mutated into armed control and \u2018sectarian cleansing\u2019, while the wild laissez-faire<\/em> economy transformed into mafia predation. This new order was a new form of war: the war waged by the militias against the State and its citizens.<\/p>\n

Political and military power became the principal means of the emergence of a highly profitable economic system run by the various militias, which we can easily call mafias inasmuch as they use what is usually called \u2018extra economic coercion\u2019 for economic purposes. It can also be safely said that militias interests invested in that economic system were partly responsible for the prolongation of the war. Let not the term \u2018warlord\u2019 lead us into believing in some \u2018feudal\u2019 nature attributed to the heads of the Lebanese militias. They were capitalist entrpreneurs in their own right in addition to being partners of members of the country\u2019s traditional commercial-financial oligarchy. One of Frederic Jameson\u2019s brilliant observations is that the generation of revenues profit without capital investment was the ultimate aim of the capitalist. If that were true, and I think it is, the tribute-collection and tax-farming role of the Lebanese warlords, and their capitalist partners, achieved that supreme capitalist phantasm, through the militias\u2019 parasitical levy on practically all economic activities.[i]<\/p>\n

Cantons and ports <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

The war created a new configuration of space.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Beirut\u2019s central and centralizing role- in the economic, political and administrative fields- exploded in favour of no less than ten militia-controlled cantons mostly built around a number of \u2018illegal\u2019 ports. Similarly, the central market towns of the interior lost their function or were replaced by new ones. In the hinterland, Christian Catholic Zahleh ceded its monopoly role as the economic and administrative capital of the Biqa` to a number of localities, among them Ba`albak (Shi`i), while Maronite Dayr al-Qamar, in the Shuf (Mount Lebanon) lost much of its role to neighboring Ba`aqlin (Druze).<\/p>\n

The first illegal ports on the Lebanese coast emerged at the beginning of the war and were used to smuggle arms. Later they became economic enterprises in their own right and controlled foreign trade.<\/p>\n

In the extreme North, the small port of al-`Abdeh was primarily engaged in imports destined for the Syrian market. The port of Tripoli was still run by the Lebanese government but with Syrian control and \u2018protection\u2019. Businessman Tariq Fakhr al-Din on behalf of the fundamentalist Islamist organization al-Tawhid<\/em> administered al-Mahdi<\/em> port just south of the northern city. Shikka\u2019s port, further south, primarily exported the products of its cement factories, under the protection of the Marada<\/em> Maronite militia, led by the Frangieh clan of ex-President of the Republic Suleiman Frangieh (1970-1976) in partnership with the Syrian Nationalist Social Party and other pro-Syrian groups. Juniyeh port, run by the right wing Christian militia, the Lebanese Forces, imported arms, ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Maronite enclave (baptized Marounistan by the foreign press) and ran a regular ferry to Cyprus. The port of Beirut\u2019s fifth basin was under the control of the Phalange party and the Lebanese Forces. Uza`i, south of Beirut, was run by the Shiite Amal militia, led by Nabih Berri, beginning in 1984, while the neighboring ports of Khaldeh and Jiyeh were operated by Walid Junblat\u2019s Progressive Socialist Party as outlets for the Druze canton in the Shuf region. Users of the port of Sidon had to pay their duties twice, once to the government authorities and again to the Popular Nasserite Organisation led by Mustafa Sa`d. A part of the port\u2019s revenues were also paid to the Israeli surrogate South Lebanese Army (SLA) led dissident general Lahd as the port was within reach of SLA artillery. The port of Zahrani, under the control of Birri\u2019s Amal, was mainly used to import fuel oil. Its revenues were divided between Amal and the Lebanese government and a share also went as \u2018protection money\u2019 to General Lahd. Finally, the port at Naqura, on the Lebanese-Israeli border, had since 1978 been managed by the South Lebanese Army and the Israeli army. It imported goods for the Israeli-controlled southern strip.<\/p>\n

Marginalisation of the State<\/strong> <\/em><\/p>\n

Long robbed of its monopoly of violence, its army divided along sectarian lines, the Lebanese State- whose power was at times reduced to the parameters of the Presidential Palace in Ba`bda- had to coexist, as the weaker partner in a true duality of power with the militias, which yielded real power over the greater part of Lebanese territory. Militias took over the majority of the State\u2019s income-generating functions, especially those that provided the bulk of State revenues- customs duties and indirect taxes. At least a quarter of the State\u2019s revenues were thus reverted to the militia funds. Further, the State\u2019s monopoly over the audio-visual media was shattered as a dozens of militia-owned TV stations and FM radios went on the air.<\/p>\n

Sectarian division and purification<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

When the militias finally \u2018cleansed\u2019 their territories and came to control \u2018their own people\u2019 and run their affairs, pressure on the individual to define himself\/herself in terms of a unique social and cultural sectarian identity reached its climax. Militia power not only practiced ethnic, sectarian and political \u2018cleansing\u2019 of territories but also committed what Juan Goytisolo has aptly called \u2018memoricide\u2019, the eradication of all memories of coexistence and common interests among Lebanese. Instead, they imposed their discourse of \u2018protection\u2019 on their own \u2018people\u2019: the \u2018other\u2019 wants to kill you, we are here to save your lives.<\/p>\n

Paradoxically, however, when the sectarian system achieved its paramount goal – self-rule of each community on its own territory- the contradictions inherent in the system exploded in the most violent forms. War shifted from inter-sectarian fighting to a bitter struggle for power and control inside each community. The notion of a unique political and military representation of the community, undertaken for a brief period under Bashir Jumayil, became the dream of each and every militia leader. This period of the cantonization of the Lebanese space witnessed the bloodiest confrontations of the war: the \u2018war of the camps\u2019 between Amal and the Palestinian organisations (in West Beirut and Southern Lebanon), periodic fighting between Amal and the Socialist Progressive Party of Walid Junblat and the parties of the ex- Lebanese National Movement (for the control over West Beirut), bitter and prolonged fighting between Amal and Hizb Allah (in Beirut, the Biqa` and the South) for the monopoly of representation of the Shiites. On the other hand, fighting erupted regularly inside the Christian between different factions of the Lebanese Forces themselves (Ja`ja` and Hubayqa) and culminated in two destructive wars between the Lebanese Forces and the Army of General Michel `Awn.<\/p>\n

Pillage, piracy and robbery<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Difficult as it is to calculate the sums involved in the arms traffic during the Lebanese wars,[ii] a large surplus of arms and ammunitions existed throughout the war to turn the PLO organizations and the warring Lebanese into international arms dealers. Afghan guerillas, the Yemeni tribes and the protagonists of the war in the former Yugoslavia were among their many customers.<\/p>\n

Drug trafficking was the economic activity in which all militias collaborated. During the war period, the surface of hashish cultivation doubled and came to occupy more than 40 per cent of the cultivable land in the Biqa`. In 1988, hashish cultivation covered 25,000 hectares (compared with 16,000 four years earlier) producing some 900 metric tons of hashish. More importantly, poppy cultivation, unknown in Lebanon before the war, had come to cover 3,000 hectares in 1988(compared to only 60 hectares in 1984). Clandestine laboratories produced 6 tons of heroine and also served to process raw Columbian coke.<\/p>\n

The estimated value of narcotics produced in Lebanon was around US$ 6 billion\/year and the profits estimated at US$ 2 billion.[iii] The yearly tributes accruing to the various parties that controlled the traffic have been estimated at between $500 million to $1 billion, by these we mean primarily Syrian officials and officers and militia leaders.[iv] It should be added that the US government through its narcotics bureau used to pay some US $ 40 million to the Syrian government in order to destroy hashish and poppy cultivated areas and the UN paid US$ 80 million.<\/p>\n

The Lebanese war was the scene of the most famous robberies of recent times: the pillage of the Port of Beirut by the Phalangist party (estimated at $ 1 billion) and the robbery by a Palestinian organisation of the British Bank of the Middle East which entered the Guinness Book of Records<\/em> as the biggest bank robbery of all time (estimated at \u00a320-50 million). To these we should add the regular practice of stealing cars, which became a lucrative trade in itself throughout the war. According to police files, during only eight months in 1985-6, a total of 1945 cars were registered as stolen, the majority in Beirut.<\/p>\n

Georges Corm has estimated the total revenue accruing from pillage and robbery during the Lebanese civil war at $ 5-7 billion.[v]<\/p>\n

The illegal ports engaged in smuggling cigarettes, drugs and arms; they also dealt with contraband in commercial goods and livestock. It has been calculated that the value of goods smuggled into Syria, Israel and Cyprus through Lebanon amounted to LL 21 billion in 1986.<\/p>\n

A modern form of piracy took on an exaggerated importance during the Lebanese war as merchants\u2019 ships along the Lebanese coast were deviated from their course, their merchandise sequestrated and the ships sunk or returned to service under a different name, registration and flag. The LF mainly carried out this activity, allegedly in collaboration with the Italian Mafia. Between 1986 and 1989, 140 ships en route to the Indian Ocean disappeared along the Lebanese coast. By 1989, British insurance companies, Llyods in particular, had paid no less than \u00a3120 million in compensation for ship owners who suffered from piracy on the Lebanese coast.<\/p>\n

Militia-controlled ports were also engaged in the import of toxic waste from Europe, dumped inland in return for large sums of money.[vi] Strange bedfellows received the money: in a famous case of dumping wasted Italian mustard gas from WWI in the Christian part of Mount Lebanon, it was revealed that the beneficiaries were the LF militias and the sons of `Abdel Halim Khaddam, at the time Syrian vice-President and responsible for the Lebanese \u2018file\u2019.<\/p>\n

Tribute and protection money<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

A complementary aspect of the aforementioned new configuration of space were the armed checkpoints and passageways on the \u2018borders\u2019 between the different cantons, which had the dual function of controlling entry and exit to the zone under militia control and serving as customs posts. The various militias imposed their tolls on passengers, vehicles and merchandise. Passengers paid a fixed tax, while cars were taxed on the estimated value of the goods transported and the nature of the vehicle itself (tourist car, van or truck). At the LF checkpoints, goods were taxed at 2 per cent of their estimated value. On the road to South Lebanon, one had to pass the checkpoint of the Popular Nasserite Organisation of Mustafa Sa`d on the outskirts of Sidon, further on; one would find Amal militiamen taxing trucks leaving the oil refinery at Zahrani. Further south, the five checkpoints of the SLA were designed to seal off the Israeli occupied zone economically from the rest of Lebanon and help divert its economy towards Northern Israel.<\/p>\n

Most militias imposed a head tax. Protection money and income taxes were imposed on economic activities: agricultural enterprises, commercial and industrial firms, liberal professions, etc. A direct lump sum tax of $30 per month was imposed on all industrial or commercial enterprises. Thereafter, enterprises were taxed according to their importance. Tourist centers and beaches, for example, were taxed at the rate of LL 350-550\/m2 of the center\u2019s installations and cottages at the rate of LL 2,500-5,000\/m2. Sand extraction along the coast was taxed per cubic meter likewise by the LF and Amal. This activity turned out to be so profitable that Amal created its own company for sand extraction in partnership with migrant capital. The bulk of the revenues of the Northern canton of the Marada came from protection money imposed on the cement plants of Shikka, taxed at the rate of $3-5 per tonne. Most big companies, like Middle East Airlines and the Regie, the tobacco and cigarette state monopoly, paid enormous sums in protection money to almost all of the militias. In the agricultural areas of the South, the Amal militia levied a tax on land ownership at the rate of $2\/dunum. Consumers\u2019 goods were equally taxed: cigarettes (5 per cent of the price), cigars ($ 3 per cigar box), cinema and theatre tickets (3 per cent of the price), restaurant bills (5 per cent of the sum), etc.<\/p>\n

Another important source of militia fiscal revenues were taxes and dues levied on administrative formalities previously gathered by the State: registration of transfers of landed property, registration of cars, building permits, work permits, residence permits for foreigners, etc. The decrease in State revenues led to the increase of the public debt, which doubled five times in five years from LL 7 billion in 1981 to LL 35 billion in 1985. It has been estimated that the militias expropriated at least a quarter of the State\u2019s revenues.[vii]<\/p>\n

Militias as business enterprises<\/strong> <\/em><\/p>\n

In addition to robbing the State\u2019s revenues and heavily taxing their \u2018own\u2019 communities, the militias in power articulated their economic activities around the dominant and more profitable services and commercial economic sectors. After 1983, the main militias took control of a large part of the import trade and all distribution of fuel and flour. In addition to their monopoly control over those vital products, they imposed high taxes on their consumption and reaped enormous profits from speculation on the differences in the prices of those commodities between different Lebanese regions.<\/p>\n

Practically all foreign trade was in militia hands. The newly created ports had become militia-owned enterprises. The Phalange and LF managed to buy the majority of the shares in the company that runs the port of Beirut. Containers were taxed at the rate of $800 per unit. Imported cars were taxed at the rate of 20 per cent of their price. In Naqura, Lebanese businessman Samir al-Hajj engaged in the re-export business: Israeli merchandise destined for Arab markets, camouflaged as Lebanese products. He paid $15 million in yearly protection money to the SLA, which gives an idea of the volume of his trade.<\/p>\n

Cooperation between the militias in the narcotics traffic and in the distribution rackets laid the foundation for future cooperation in other fields. The same militia representatives who sit on joint \u2018security\u2019 committees, as representatives of belligerents at war, would, perhaps in the same day, reconvene as members of the board of directors of companies that they now collectively controlled- TMA, the national air transport company, for one- or meet to divide their revenues from the distribution of butane gas. Strange bedfellows like the general secretary of the pro-Syrian Ba`th party and the sons of the Christian right-wing leader Kamil Sham`un were partners in the lottery business, which held monopoly rights over all Lebanese territory.<\/p>\n

Not only did militias \u2018exchange services\u2019 with sections of the bourgeoisie (protection money in return for import and export quotas or sheer profiteering), but they soon became large business enterprises in their own right and an integral part of that class, entering into close business partnerships with many of its members, especially in the flour and fuel trade. And as war neared its final phase, the warlords had \u2018laundered\u2019 a part of their capital into privately owned companies.<\/p>\n

One economic sector which was left untouched by the militias was the banking sector. Apart from the above mentioned robbery of the BMME, the banks were safe throughout the war. No doubt large sums of protection money were paid to the various militias. Banks are and remain the sacred cow of Lebanon\u2019s economic system. Unfortunately, research into that sector is very rare and fragmentary.<\/p>\n

One other important function of the \u2018informal\u2019 militia economy was the development of a black market for imports to Syria, which involved a number of ports and the central Biqa` region. These imports through Lebanon served a double function for Syria. First, they allowed it the import from the external markets of commodities blocked by the strict foreign trade regulations. Second, the control of the black market operations by the Syrian government officials and especially the high ranking officers was the implementation of a classical strategy used by president Hafez Assad to corrupt and control his aides.<\/p>\n

War and social mobility<\/strong><\/p>\n

How were the revenues of these enormous enterprises distributed? One part was invested in the war effort. Another became the personal fortune of the warlords, deposited in Swiss banks or invested abroad. Yet another part was reinvested in a number of \u2018holding companies\u2019 duly registered in Lebanon, the three main ones being under the control of the Lebanese Forces, the Amal movement and the Progressive Socialist Party of Walid Junblat. A striking aspect of sectarianism in business, these Maronite, Shi`i and Druze holdings, came to own a number of companies operating in all economic sectors: private ports, import-export trade, cement factories, tourism, real estate agencies, FM radios, television companies, newspapers and publishing houses, to name but a few.<\/p>\n

In the early phase of the war the sacking of the Port of Beirut and the city centre were orgiastic forms of redistribution of wealth. Later on, redistribution became more stratified as the \u2018masses\u2019 withdrew gradually from the stage. Although the above-mentioned forms of income redistribution by military and political means were not restricted to the warlords, the amounts that trickled down to the rank and file militiamen are more difficult to identify, especially since social mobility related to emigration cannot be easily be differentiated from that arising from the war itself. We can safely say that mafism in Lebanon, the highest stage of clientelism, follows the same logic as any other form of clientelism, that of \u2018uneven exchange\u2019 and \u2018uneven distribution\u2019 between patrons and clients, except for the fact that the main role of clients in war was to die for their patrons.<\/p>\n

[i] Data concerning the militias has been compounded from many private testimonies and published sources among which are: David Hirst: \u2018Jumhuriyat al-Milishiyat\u2019, al-Qabas, nos. 98-100, 26-28 August, 1985; <\/em>\u2018L\u2019argent des milices\u2019, Les Cahiers de l\u2019Orient<\/em>, Paris, No. 10, 1988; al-Hayat<\/em> series of articles on the Lebanese militias, their administration and revenues, 31 December 1990 – 9 February 1991; \u2018Le Livre Noir des Forces Libanaises\u2019 in L\u2019Eveil<\/em>, Centre Libanais d\u2019Information (CLI), No. 2, 17 May 1990; Ph. de V., \u2018Les ports de l\u2019angoisse…et des Pirates\u2019, L\u2019Ev\u00e9nement du Jeudi,<\/em> Paris, No. 233, 20-26 April 1989; Georges Corm: \u2018Liban: h\u00e9g\u00e9monie milicienne et probl\u00e8me du r\u00e9tablissement de l\u2019Etat\u2019, Maghreb- Machreq<\/em>, No. 131, January-March 1991, pp. 13-25.<\/p>\n

[ii] At the beginning of the war, when observers still made estimates of arms contracts by Lebanese belligerents, Sampson put those contracts at between $200-600 million and named two arms dealers: Sarkis Soghanalian, representative of Colt industries, and Dany, son of ex-President Kamil Sham`un, considered by the author as the biggest arms dealer on the Christian side. David Hirst estimated the cost of one day of artillery duels at LL 25 million, while an Arab source put the cost of one day of fighting with light weaponry at between $150,000 and $500,000. This should give an idea of the sums consumed in more than 5,000 days of war and a very rough estimate of the profits made from arms sales. A. Sampson,The Arms Bazaar,<\/em> 5th<\/sup> edn (London: 1985, p.21).<\/p>\n

[iii] Denis Eisenberg, The World and I Magazine<\/em> (June 1990).<\/p>\n

[iv] Newman, Love and Death in Beirut<\/em>, p. 212.<\/p>\n

[v] Corm: \u2018Liban: h\u00e9g\u00e9monie milicienne\u2019, pp. 14.<\/p>\n

[vi] In June 1988, were discovered 200 barrels containing toxic waste from Italy imported by sea and dumped in the LF-controlled canton. Though Italian experts admitted they contained chemicals used in the making of chemical arms during WW II, the Italian government refused to take back the goods on the grounds that the deal was made between private companies and did not engage the Italian State. The importer, identified as Armand Nassar, was a close collaborator of the Lebanese Forces. Based in Cyprus, he fled the island in due time to escape an international arrest warrant upon request of the Lebanese government. The affair of dumped toxic waste reemerged in 1994-95 after a Ministry for the Environment was created. Two revelations were made: i) new dumping locations for toxic waste and thousands of barrels were discovered all over the country, some of them constituted an imminent threat to the water resources; ii) top officials of that ministry were believed to be implicated in the import of toxic waste in militia days. Despite serious accusations against the ministry, the affair was hushed up.<\/p>\n

[vii] Hirst, \u2018Jumhuriyat al-Milishiyat\u2019.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Political Economy of Militia Control Brown University, 26 April 2007 It has been said that wars have no sense but functions. In fulfilling a series of extra-military functions, the Lebanese civil war created its own order, an order that was a monstrous mutation of its pre-war political and economic system: the autonomy of the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_wp_rev_ctl_limit":""},"categories":[],"content_type":[531],"themes":[305,315],"country":[337],"language":[66],"archive_type":[113],"archive_author":[246],"media_type":[],"keywords":[591,706,726,1044,1051,1084,1089,1100,1102,1110,1172,1181,1262,1281,1396,1520,1675,1533],"ft_dossier":[3346,3355],"ft_categories":[],"published_in":[439],"class_list":["post-202","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","content_type-papers-en","themes-history-en","themes-political-economy-en","country-lebanon-en","language-english","archive_type-by-ft-en","archive_author-fawwaz-traboulsi-en","keywords-amal-movement-en","keywords-beirut-en","keywords-capitalism-en","keywords-laissez-faire-en","keywords-lebanese-civil-war-en","keywords-lebanese-political-economy-en","keywords-lebanese-resistance-en","keywords-lebanon-kw-en","keywords-lecture-en","keywords-literary-criticism-en","keywords-mount-lebanon-en","keywords-nabih-berri-en","keywords-phalangists-en","keywords-political-economy-kw-en","keywords-sectarianism-en","keywords-walid-jumblatt-en","keywords-war-en","keywords-warlords-en","ft_dossier-lebanon-war-en","ft_dossier-political-economy-justice-en","published_in-conference-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/202","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=202"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/202\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=202"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"content_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/content_type?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"themes","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/themes?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/language?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"archive_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/archive_type?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"archive_author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/archive_author?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"media_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media_type?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"keywords","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/keywords?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"ft_dossier","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ft_dossier?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"ft_categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ft_categories?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"published_in","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/published_in?post=202"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}