{"id":205,"date":"2007-09-06T22:09:48","date_gmt":"2007-09-06T19:09:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/fawwaztraboulsi.com\/?p=205"},"modified":"2025-03-03T10:11:17","modified_gmt":"2025-03-03T08:11:17","slug":"saudi-expansion-the-lebanese-connection-1924-1952","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/saudi-expansion-the-lebanese-connection-1924-1952\/","title":{"rendered":"Saudi expansion: The Lebanese Connection\u00a0(1924-1952)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Saudi expansion: The Lebanese Connection <\/strong>(1924-1952)<\/strong><\/p>\n

Fawwaz Traboulsi<\/p>\n

Presented at the Conference \u2018Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Expansion in the World\u2019, King\u2019s College, University of London, 6-9 September 2007.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Lebanon is the first Arab country to become the theater of the political and economic expansion of the emerging Saudi kingdom, with the exception of the immediate Gulf surrounding. The story of this connection in all its aspects and modalities is yet to be written. I can only pretend here to present a brief survey of the state of my research on that topic, which forms part of a wider study of the Lebanese business class and its intervention in politics.<\/p>\n

This paper will focus on three major aspects of Saudi expansion into Lebanon: i) the penetration of Saudi economic interests into Lebanon, which will serve as a place for investment, an intermediary link to the world market, an exporter of labor and man power, and a provider of educational, health and other services; ii) the story of the man who was the main agent of that penetration in its earlier stage, Hussein `Uwayni (1900-1970); iii) the influence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) on Lebanese politics, internally and externally, from the period of the French mandate to the end of the first independence regime, 1924-1952.<\/p>\n

During that period, KSA\u2019s political role in Lebanon was important not only in defending Lebanon against Hashemite designs, but also because it became the main regional broker of its politics. Internally, Saudi influence helped strengthen the office of the Prime Minister, reserved to a Sunni Muslim, and insured the accession of a Saudi national to that office.<\/p>\n

\u2018The Syrian merchant Hussein `Uwayni\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n

Contrary to received wisdom, the late Rafic Hariri, Lebanon\u2019s Prime Minister assassinated in 2005, is not the first Saudi national to occupy the post of prime minister in Lebanon. Four decades before him, Hussein `Uwayni, de facto<\/em> Saudi national, official representative of Saudi interests in Lebanon, and one of the richest men in the country, if not the richest, had occupied that post as early as 1951. Significantly, the two men shared a striking number of points in common. Both come from a modest social background, sharing the same brief period of nationalist militancy in their youth, and entertained special relations to the Saudi family, which account for their rapid rise to wealth and influence. Both were granted Saudi nationality, one anointed \u2018Hajj\u2019 the other \u2018Sheikh\u2019, and both invaded the mainly Christian bourgeoisie from outside on the basis of wealth accumulated from emigration, and both used that wealth, rather than political constituency, to acquire \u2018honor\u2019 through the attainment of political status, and finally occupy the post of Prime Minister.<\/p>\n

Hussein `Uwayni was one of the first of those Arab chancers who offered their services to Saudi authorities even before the Sauds had achieved complete control of the Arab Peninsula and before they struck oil. Born in 1900 in Beirut into a family of the lower Sunni middle class, his father Ahmad was into the Mal Qabban<\/em> business, the retail trade in cereals. Having lost his father young, he was raised by his mother, Mansoura Shibib al-`Ashi. In 1915, the young Hussein had to interrupt his studies in various Christian religious institutions (Saint Joseph de l\u2019Apparition and College Patriarchal) at the outbreak of WW1 and become active in nationalist politics for Arab independence and unity.<\/p>\n

In 1920, Syria was partitioned and the \u2018Grand Liban\u2019, in its present boundaries, declared under French Mandate against the will of the majority of Lebanon\u2019s Muslims and of sizeable sections of its Christians. Violence erupted in the mandated territories. In Beirut As`ad bey Khurshid, a pro-Mandate director of the Ministry of the Interior, was assassinated. The French accused the Beiruti notable and opponent of the Mandate, Salim `Ali Salam, and a number of anti-mandate activists. Among them was Hussein `Uwayni who was sentenced to two months in prison and five months forced residence in Amyun (the Kura district, Lebanon).[1]<\/a><\/sup> Upon his release, in 1921, `Uwayni moved to Jeddah, in what was then the Sultanate of Najd, where he worked in a textile mill owned by the Lebanese `Arif al-Na`mani. The year after, he married the daughter of a Syrian from the Khojah family whose father was his colleague at work.<\/p>\n

However, `Uwayni\u2019s relations to the Sauds began thanks to another Lebanese. Amin Rihani, the American-Lebanese traveler and writer, who was visiting the Arab Peninsula in 1924-5. Rihani, whose travels in the Arab World were destined to convince Arab rulers to unite, was particularly interested in a peaceful solution to the conflict between Ali, King of Hijaz, and Ibn Saud, Sultan of Najd, both his friends. He dispatched \u2018the Syrian merchant\u2019 Hussein`Uwayni, who had received him in his Jeddah home, to Ibn Saud, whose armed tribesmen were besieging the city, to serve as an intermediary between the two chiefs. The mediation, designed to ward off armed confrontation between did not amount to much. In 1925, Jedda fell to the Sauds. Sharif `Ali fled to his brother Faysal, recently crowned by the British king of Iraq. In 1926, Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud was declared king of Hejaz and in 1932, King of Saudi Arabia.[2]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Though `Uwayni did not succeed in his mediation, he was nevertheless adopted by Abdul `Aziz and soon became part of a group of Syrians and Lebanese merchants, government officials and advisors working for the Saudi family. Notable among those were two Lebanese Druze, Najib Salha, was secretary of Saudi Finance Minister, and Fu\u2019ad Hamzah, assistant Minister of Foreign Afairs, `Abd Allah Suleiman, and Yussef Yassin, a Syrian close advisor of `Abd al-`Aziz, later his Minister of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n

`Uwayni accumulated a large fortune in Saudi Arabia where he worked for some twenty years. Early on, the Saudi government interceded on his behalf with the French authorities who lifted their ban on his travels in Fench-mandated territories and he set upon representing French interests in the Kingdom. In 1930, he became exclusive agent of Collas et Michel<\/em>, the concessionary company for servicing and building the lighthouses of the Ottoman Empire which was engaged in providing electricity for the coast of the Red Sea.[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

In 1932, the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Husein Aoueini et Associ\u00e9s<\/em> and the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Commerciale Arabe<\/em> are established in partnership with Najib Salha and Ibrahim Shaker, a Saudi businessman who will engage in various business enterprises with `Uwayni in Lebanon and whose son Ghassan will later marry `Uwayni\u2019s daughter. Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Husein Aoueini <\/em>was the first importer of cars into Saudi Arabia, acting as agent to US brands Chrysler, Packard and Willis Jeeps. But it also catered for the import of lorries, building equipment and car tires. The Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Commerciale Arabe<\/em> imported mainly pharmaceutics and became the main provider for the Kingdom\u2019s mushrooming hospitals. As the kingdom did not yet have any water installations, `Uwayni\u2019s companies also imported water in cisterns mounted on White<\/em> American lorries. In 1934, `Uwayni and Shaker obtained the concession for representing the Banque Fonciere Egyptienne<\/em>. `Uwayni also became maritime agent for two Saudi transport companies catering for the transport of pilgrims to Mecca, both founded by prince Faysal bin `Abd al-Aziz and members of the Saudi family.<\/p>\n

`Uwayni also collaborated with an influential Lebanese businessman established in Manchester in the textile business, Abdel-Ghani Ydlibi, and became his representative in Jedda. Ydlibi, Salha, `Uwayni and Shakir acted as brokers for King Abdul Aziz in his negotiations with oil companies in 1933 which resulted in the first Saudi concession to Standard Oil of California.[4]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

In fact, `Uwayni\u2019s activities went beyond Saudi Arabia. In Palestine 1934 he owned a textile mill in partnership with the Lebanese Hassan Bohsali, a rich Lebanese who was one of the funders of independence Prime Minister of Lebanon, Riyad Sulh.<\/p>\n

In 1939, `Uwayni founds in Beirut La societe libano-arabe pour le commerce<\/em> to represent Saudi interests in Lebanon and serve Saudi nationals visiting the country for business, tourism or study. In that same year, he married Shafica Jaroudy in second marriage and henceforth spent his time commuting between Beirut and Jeddah until he finally settled in the Lebanese capital in 1947. On the eve of independence, `Uwayni was already established as Saudi Arabia\u2019s man in the country. General Spears, appointed British Minister for Syria and Leabon in 1942, calls him in his papers the \u2018commercial agent of Ibn Saud\u2019.[5]<\/a><\/sup> In fact he was more than a commercial agent, \u201che was the de facto<\/em> ambassador and the banker of the Saudi royal family\u201d as his biographer notes.[6]<\/a><\/sup> Ibn Saud meant to appoint him since 1944 his plenipotentiary minister in Lebanon. The British government, at the instigation of General Spears, advised against the nomination. Spears had explained in an official note that it was \u2018nearly certain\u2019 that `Uwayni would use his acess to the diplomatic pouch for \u2018contraband operations\u2019, recalling that `Uwayni was initially barred entry to Mandated territory for that cause and that His Majesty\u2019s Government ahd only accepted to lift the ban to please the Saudis.[7]<\/a><\/sup> The Saudis did not push on and `Uwayni had to be contented with the status of \u2018commercial agent\u2019. The state of our research does not yet allow us to determine what kind of contraband Spears was referring to. Is it `Uwayni\u2019s activities in purchasing arms with Saudi money for the Palestinian resistance, as Gehchan claims,[8]<\/a><\/sup> or to some other form of contraband, related to the gold trade, as Spears infers.<\/p>\n

In fact, the most lucrative of `Uwayni\u2019s business activities was in the gold transit trade through Beirut to Saudi Arabia, mainly destined to the safes of the Saudi royal family. That episode, during which Ibn Saud was changing his petrodollars into gold bullion, is not mentioned in `Uwayni\u2019s biography, but nevertheless emphasized in a report on the wealth of the Lebanese merchant class by the US trade attach\u00e9 in Beirut, Harold Minor.[9]<\/a><\/sup> After WWII, Beirut had become a major world entrep\u00f4t and transit market for the gold trade (the other trade centers being Kuwait and Tangiers). This trade reached its peak in 1951 with a $100 million turnover, when Beirut was estimated to carry on at least 20% of the world gold trade, as the volume of its gold transactions shot up from 355 kilos in 1946 to 89,293 kilos in 1951. At least 75% of this volume was for the transit trade. Another US embassy report from Beirut estimates the profits from that trade at $6 million annually and the number of Lebanese at all levels employed in it at that no more than 100.[10]<\/a><\/sup> In fact, a handful of bankers and rich merchants and rentiers controlled the trade and reaped the profits. `Uwayni was one of them if not the main beneficiary. According to Minor, in his capacity as CEO of the Banque Indochine<\/em> of Jeddah, `Uwayni was responsible for the gold transactions between the bank\u2019s branch in Jeddah and the Beirut branch. Strangely enough, there is no mention of this business activity in Gehchan\u2019s biography.<\/p>\n

`Uwayni in the Lebanese \u2018Consortium\u2019 <\/strong><\/p>\n

Back in Lebanon, `Uwayni became the most important financial personality in the country, only second to Busson, the French patron of the Banque de Syrie et du Liban (BSL) the bank that issued the currency, administered the State\u2019s finances and controlled credit and commercial exchanges with France. Busson represented the continuation of French neo-colonial economic power in Syria and Lebanon. And `Uwayni became his closest aid and associate.<\/p>\n

By the force of his imposing wealth, `Uwayni made his way into the exclusively Christian Lebanese oligarchy. He became the only Muslim in what Harold Minor, calls \u2018the President\u2019s clique\u2019 that comprised Khuri\u2019s brother Fu\u2019ad, his son Khalil, and a dozen related families.[11]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

A wider circle around the \u2018President\u2019s clique\u2019 were some 30 families composing what the opposition press called the \u2018Consortium\u2019.[12]<\/a><\/sup> In sectarian composition, the families of the oligarchy were mainly Christian: 24 Christian families (nine Maronites, seven Greek Catholic, one Latin, one Protestant, four Greek Orthodox and one Armenian), to six Muslim (four Sunni, one Shiite and one Druze). Christian families of the oligarchy were known to practice extended endogamy in order to preserve, or increase, family wealth and property and advance business partnerships. In one generation, at least ten of the oligarchy\u2019s families (Pharaon, Chiha, Khuri, Haddad, Frayj, Kittani, `Aridah, Bustrus, `Asayli, Dumit) were associated by matrimonial bonds.<\/p>\n

The capital of the oligarchy came from three main sources: i) the silk economy and the import trade during the Mutasarrifiya<\/em> period (the autonomous zone of Mount Lebanon, 1861-1915); ii) war profits (between 1940 and 1944 allied troops spent \u00a376 million in Syria and Lebanon); and iii) emigrant money from Africa, the Americas and the oil-producing Arab countries (Iraq and Saudi Arabia especially).<\/p>\n

The extensive monopolistic control, which those families held over the main axes of the country\u2019s economy is impressive, especially compared to the free trade pretensions of the \u2018merchant republic\u2019. In finance, they owned a dozen local or mixed banks, headed by the BSL. The biggest insurance company, the Union Nationale<\/em>, was a partnership between members of the Consortium and French capital.<\/p>\n

The above-mentioned interests were mainly importers of<\/p>\n

Western manufactured products and controlled the biggest share of the market for food products, arms and ammunitions, agricultural and industrial equipment, beverages, medical and pharmaceutical products, construction material, electric equipment and telecommunication, stationery, wood, hardware, coffee, cars, spare parts, etc. Of the 50 agencies representing US firms, half were in the hands of one family, the Kettaneh, and the rest distributed among Fattal, Sahnawi and Pharaon.<\/p>\n

Families of the Consortium were also pioneers in tourism: they owned the country\u2019s biggest and most luxurious hotels in Beirut (the St. Georges and Bristol hotels), the estivage<\/em> centers of Bhamdun and Sawfar and the ski centers of Faraya and the Cedars. In the services sector, the Consortium, in association with French interests, controlled almost all of the franchise holding societies and public services companies: the port of Beirut, the water and electricity companies (Beirut, Qadisha, Nahr al-Barid), the R\u00e9gie des tabacs et tombacs, etc.<\/p>\n

The Consortium also controlled the biggest construction companies in the country (la R\u00e9gie des travaux) and one later, the biggest in the Middle East (the C.A.T. of Emile Bustani). The two principal air transport companies, Air Liban and Middle East Airlines, and the biggest land transport company were owned by members of the oligarchy. In industry, the oligarchy controled the main industrial firms in electricity, cement, textile, beer, matches, agricultural products, vegetable oil, paint, glass, etc. Finally, all the families mentioned had large holdings in real estate in both city and countryside.<\/p>\n

An estimated value of the fortunes of 15 of those families amounted to 245 millions LL, the equivalent of nine times the State budget for 1944 and to more than 40% of the national revenue for 1948. A significant portion of those fortunes was invested overseas. `Uwayni\u2019s fortune alone was estimated at $15 million.<\/p>\n

The extent to which `Uwayni quickly embedded himself into that consortium is impressive to say the least. His investments cover all the major sectors of the Lebanese economy of the time, all in close association with the men of the Consortium. He founds with Mikhael Sahnaoui aninvestment company, the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de financement et d\u2019exploitation des enterprises<\/em>, and with Sahnaoui and Michel Khattar the Compagnie Gen\u00e9rale des Transports<\/em>, and is in partnership with his partners from KSA, Salha and Shaker, in a textile firm, the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de fialture et de tissage<\/em>. In 1947, he founds with his partners and Egyptian businessmen the Tucker<\/em> firm for the transport of cars into Egypt, and is the agent, with Ibrahim Saad in Lebanon, for the concession of Fiat <\/em>cars. `Uwayni creates a maritime company for the transport of pilgrims between Lebanon, Egypt and Jeddah. He is one of the founders of Air Liban<\/em> in 1945. In 1951, he founds with the Lebanese \u00e9migr\u00e9 Georges Ma`louf and Shaker la Banque du Liban et d\u2019outre mer<\/em>, (BLOM) the first Lebanese bank since the 1960s. In 1963, Air Liban merged with the other local airline Middle East Airlines<\/em> (MEA). And in 1966, `Uwayni founds in association with MEA\u2019s Najib `Alameddine and another businessman, Georges Bishara Karam, a petrol distribution firm, the Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 libanaise de distribution des carburants<\/em>, which makes `Uwayni\u2019s initial firm, the Lebanese Petroleum company<\/em> (LEPCO),<\/em> established since 1951, a supplier of the Lebanese air fleet.[13]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

From the Consortium to Politics<\/strong><\/p>\n

During the first independence regime of Bisahra Khuri (1943-1952), thirteen of the oligarchy\u2019s members were elected deputies for Parliament, five held cabinet posts and one was nominated prime minister (`Uwayni himself). Most of the MPs of the oligarchy were \u2018parachuted\u2019 into the peripheries, particularly the Biqa` and the South, where they played the role of funders of the large electoral lists of the \u2018political feudalists\u2019. Under the Khuri regime, thirty six deputies (of whom twenty six were Christians) owned or were shareholders in the country\u2019s biggest 230 firms.[14]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

`Uwayni himself was elected deputy for Beirut in the 25 May 1947 rigged elections of \u2018Black May\u2019, as they were called in reference to the role money and government coercion played in bringing to Parliament a majority of MPs that supported Bishara al-Khuri\u2019s claim for a new mandate and insured his reelection for that new mandate two years later. The elections and the renewal of Khuri\u2019s mandate added fuel to an already growing opposition led by Kamil Sham`un and Kamal Junblatt, who charged the regime with corruption and affairism. `Uwayni himself voted for the constitutional amendment, allowing the President a second term of office, and for Khuri\u2019s new mandate.[15]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

The year 1948 witnesses the beginning of `Uwayni\u2019s executive career. He is appointed Minister of Finance in a new Sulh government. And on 24 February 1950 he succeeded Sulh at the head of new \u2018neutral\u2019 government of three ministers Edouard Noun and Boulos Fayyad charged with the supervision of new parliamentary elections and the drafting of a new electoral law. The law increased parliamentary seats from 55 to 77 and established the ratio between Chritians and Muslims at 42 Christians to 35 Muslims. The elections were considered fair, but the country had become severely divided between loyalists and oppositionists. `Uwayni will be back in office from 14 February to 7 June 1951. Those are crucial times both for Lebanese economic and political life and for Lebanon\u2019s place in regional and international politics on which loomed the of the Arab \u2018Nakbah\u2019 of 1948 and the creation of the State of Israel.<\/p>\n

Economically, `Uwayni\u2019s participation in Sulh\u2019s governments and his leadership of two cabinets occurred against a background of major events: the liberalization of exchanges, and the ongoing differences with Syria, concerning the customs and the monetary union between the two countries and the management of the Common Interests leagued by the French Mandate. `Uwayni will be part and participant in the major economic decisions and measures that led to the creation and consolidation of the \u2018merchant republic\u2019 economically with its services-based economy. As Minister of Finance, he is mainly responsible for the liberalization of transactions and the adoption and application of Michel Chiha\u2019s theory about the gold backing of the Lebanese pound (24 May 1949). No doubt the measure also meant enormous profits for the small cartel of merchants and bankers who controlled the gold trade, prominent among them were of course Chiha and `Uwayni themselves. Last but not least, `Uwayni, in both his capacities as Prime Minister and Finance Minister, was party to the long, difficult and stormy negotiations with his Syrian counterparts that eventually led to the break up of the monetary union between the two countries in 1948 and the complete economic and customs\u2019 divorce of 1950.<\/p>\n

Looking at the events of those years from the perspective of Saudi-Lebanese relations, those last four years of Khuri\u2019s term of office were exceptionally rich in interrelated events and developments: countering Hashemite designs and Western military pacts; the Tapline pipeline; Husni al-Za`ims coup d\u2019etat and the execution of Anton Sa`adeh.<\/p>\n

Lebanon in the Saudi orbit<\/strong><\/p>\n

As soon as Lebanon and Syria gained their independence, they were faced with two serious problems in regional and international relations. On the regional level, the main challenge came from the Hashemite unity projects: King `Abdallah of Jordan and his Greater Syria and Iraq\u2019s Nuri al-Sa`id and his Fertile Crescent.<\/p>\n

Syria and Lebanon differed many issues but were united on the rejection of the Hashemite unity plans. The task was to convince Saudi Arabia to attend the Alexandria meetings for the creation of an Arab Federation in 944 and 1945. The Saudis meant to boycott the meetings in opposition to Hashemite designs. `Uwayni was charged with the delicate mission to convince the Saudis to attend in order to offset Hashemite influence. King `Abdul `Aziz agreed. Thus League of Arab States (LAS) was born, the project of Arab Federation was shelved and Lebanon benefited form an additional bonus in the form of a special resolution in support of its independence and sovereignty. And the Hashemite plans were thwarted.<\/p>\n

Opposition to the Hashemite unity plans severely affected the relations between the newly independent republics and their erstwhile supporter, Britain. Despite the fact that UK had backed Lebanese independence, the Khuri regime remained economically tied to France, and politically to Saudi Arabia, while being quite receptive to the growing interest and role of the US in the region. Thus, the relations of the first independence regime with the British were divergent on two major issues: i) British backing for the Hashemite designs; ii) the rejection by the Syrian and Lebanese independence regimes of the British projects for military pacts for the defense of the Mediterranean. On this issue, the two initial patrons of Lebanon\u2019s independence \u2013 Great Britain and Egypt — were at loggerheads.<\/p>\n

In 1950 the United States and Britain (in addition to France and Turkey) launched the project for the Collective Defense of the Mediterranean against communism. Egypt, invited to join the Western military pact with Syria and Lebanon set as a pre-condition the closing of British military bases on Egyptian territory. The condition rejected, Egypt officially called for the evacuation of the British troops from Egypt after having revoked the British-Egyptian treaty of 1936. Furthermore, Egypt took the initiative of drafting a Treaty of Arab Collective Security (TACS) signed on 13 April of that year by all the countries of the Arab League, including reluctant Jordan and Iraq. In a Arab League memorandum, the Arab states asked the European countries for arms to strengthen their defenses against Israel. In response, the Tripartite Declaration of May 1951, issued by the US, Britain and France, gave priority to defending the region against communism, criticized the Arab-Israeli arms race and declared the inviolability of the Middle East\u2019s borders, including the Arab-Israeli armistices lines of 1949. In their collective response of June 1951, the states of the Arab League retained from the Tripartite Declaration its opposition to resorting to violence to solve the problems of the region or modify armistice lines. They insisted on the defensive character of Arab armaments, rejected all pressures to impose the status quo<\/em> or negotiations with Israel, and reiterated their demand for the implementation of UN resolutions concerning the right of return for Palestinian refugees and compensation for their properties. The Arab states\u2019 response concluded with the affirmation of the sovereignty and independence of their countries.<\/p>\n

Official Lebanon had been resisting British and NATO members\u2019 pressure to join the anti-Soviet military pacts for a number of years. During a visit to Ankara, in 1949, the Turkish government had proposed to Khuri a special friendship treaty between the two countries. Khuri politely refused the offer, especially that Turkish-Syrian relations were particularly tense in that time. Britain came back with force in 1950 by requesting military facilities in Lebanon, another offer that had to be politely rejected. In that same year, Khuri and Sulh had also officially rejected renewed British offers for Lebanon to join the Mediterranean Collective Defense Pact. The two leaders had decided that Lebanon would be the last Arab state to join any foreign military pact. At best, both were ready for a bilateral defense agreement with any Western power, but not a collective military pact. In the summer of that year Sulh spent long months in France trying to convince the French to sign a bilateral agreement for the defense of Lebanon. To no avail.<\/p>\n

In the British-Egyptian conflict, official Lebanon had sided with Egypt, adhered to the TACS and signed the collective declaration. Not without reluctance. Khuri had thought the Egyptian position too blunt. And Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not exactly on the same wavelength then, as the Saudis had nuanced their position by declaring that in case of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, KSA would join the former (sic.). On the other hand, unwilling to satisfy the British, the Lebanese government was nevertheless not ready to anger the Americans. Significantly, on 24 February 1951, it was Hussein `Uwayni, in his capacity as both Prime minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who signed with the American Government the \u2018Point Four\u2019 agreement which pledged US aid to countries endangered by communism.[16]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

The Tapline Affair<\/strong><\/p>\n

The 1949 Tapline affair reveals the extent to which Saudi influence had made its inroads into the Lebanese political class. In that year, Saudi ARAMCO launched the project to build a 1,750 kilometres pipeline that crosses Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon to deliver Saudi oil to a refinery and oil terminal in the Zahrani, south of Sidon, on the Mediterranean. It was an ambitious project, not without economic and geopolitical consequences. It simply broke the monopoly hitherto held by the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) that exported Iraqi oil since 1934 to the Mediterranean via an oil terminal and a refinery in the Lebanese port of Tripoli and the Syrian port of Banyas. The pipeline was to be built by its subsidiary TAPLINE and Bechtel corporation.<\/p>\n

Saudi interests in that venture not only had their commercial agent in the person Hussein `Uwayni to rely upon, but could solicit the help of Habib Abou Shahla, the Speaker of Parliament who was Tapline\u2019s lawyer. On 28 January, the Lebanese and Syrian governments signed a convention accepting Tapline\u2019s offer of the duties to be paid for the use of Syrian and Lebanese territory on the basis of parity between the two states. But while the Lebanese Parliament ratified the agreement, the Syrian Parliament refused to ratify on the grounds that the duties paid to the Syrian budget were insufficient. Veteran Syrian politician Akram Hurani, recalls that Abou Shahla contacted him and even tried to bribe him in order to get the agreement passed in the Syrian Parliament.[17]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

Be it as it may, the Tapline affair was intimately linked to a major event in Syria, the coup d\u2019etat<\/em> of Husni Za`im, commander in chief of the Syrian army, on 30 March 1949, widely regarded as a CIA-engineered coup.[18]<\/a><\/sup> Za`im, who justified his taking over power in the name of putting an end of the corrupt and inefficient rulers who were responsible for the 1948 debacle in Palestine, ruled for only four and a half months till 14 august 1949. That was long enough to achieve two important US goals: executively pass the Tapline agreement, as he had disbanded the Parliament and signed Syria\u2019s Armistice Agreement with Israel.<\/p>\n

At first, Za`im gave the impression that he has taken over power in Syria in order to achieve unity with Iraq. Alarmed, the Egyptian and Saudi coalition tries to thwart with Saudi money. It was enough for Saudi Arabia to accord Syria a $6 million loan for Za`im to hurry to Cairo where he called for a Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian union.[19]<\/a><\/sup> Lebanon benefited from the Saudi largesse new in a different way. Za`im who had encouraged Anton Sa`adeh to launch a \u2018revolution\u2019 to topple the Khuri regime and bring about the unity of Syria and Lebanon, hurriedly delivered Sa`adeh who had sought refuge in Damascus after the failure of his attempt to the Lebanese authorities. Riyad Sulh had asked the Saudis for pressure on Za`in to deliver Sa`adeh. Brought back to Beirut, the leader of the SNSP was summarily executed after appearing before a military court.<\/p>\n

Sulh was assassinated in 1951 by a commando of the Syrian Nationalist Social Party in Amman airport while on a visit to King `Abdallah who, in his turn, is assassinated by a Palestinian youth in the al-Aqsa mosque. Khuri was forced to resign under the pressure of a political general strike of the opposition. Hussien `Uwayni refrained from taking sides in that conflict. He was the last man Khuri resorted to to form a government. `Uwayni resigned the offer and Khuri had to finally bow down to pressure from the \u2018street\u2019.<\/p>\n

Be that as it may, Khuri\u2019s rejection of the Western defense pacts had a lot to do with his demise in 1952 and the election of Kamil Sham`un known for his pro-British sympathies.<\/p>\n

Thus was closed the initial chapter of Saudi-Lebanese relations.<\/p>\n

Bibliography<\/strong><\/p>\n

– American Embassy, Beirut, to the Department of State, Washington, despatch No. 515, \u2018Beirut as a Gold Market\u2019, March 6, 1953, Foreign Service of the United States of America (FSOUSA)<\/em>, unclassified.<\/p>\n

– American Embassy, Beirut, to the Department of State, Washington, \u2018The Political Control Exercised by the Commercial Class in Lebanon\u2019, Foreign Service Of the United States of America<\/em> (FSOUSA),<\/em> dispatch no. 372, 21 January 1952, by Harold B. Minor.<\/p>\n

– American Embassy, Beirut, to the Department of State, Washington, Lane to Department of State: Memorandum of an interview with Prime Minister of Lebanon prepared by the Commercial attache,<\/em> no. 1048, secret, Beirut, 17 December 1945.<\/p>\n

– Gehchan, Roger, Hussein Aoueini: un demi-siecle d\u2019histoire du Liban et du Moyen-Orient (1920-19710<\/em>), Beyrouth: Editions FMA, 2000.<\/p>\n

– Hallaq, Hassan, Min Muzakkirat Salim `Ali Salam 1868-1938<\/em>, Beirut: Dar al-Jami`iyah, 1982.<\/p>\n

– Al-Hurani, Akram, \u2018Min Muzakkirat Akram al-Hurani\u2019, Al-Sharq<\/em> al-Awsat<\/em>, 16 July 1997.<\/p>\n

– al-Khuri, Bishara, Majmu`at Khutab, September 1943-December 1951<\/em>, Beirut: Al-Dar al-Lubnaniyyah li-l-Nash al-Jami`i, second edition, 1983.<\/p>\n

– al-Khuri, Bishara, Haqa\u2019iq Lubnaniyah<\/em>, Beirut: Al-Dar al-Lubnaniyyah li-l-Nash al-Jami`i, second edition, 1983 (in three volumes).<\/p>\n

– Lande, Paul, \u2018A King and a Concession\u2019, Saudi Aramco World,<\/em> May\/June 1984, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 4-9.<\/p>\n

– al- Rihani, Amin, Tarikh Najd al-Hadith, <\/em>Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 2nd<\/sup>. Edition, 1954.<\/p>\n

– al- Rihani, Amin, Muluk al-`Arab<\/em>, Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1964.<\/p>\n

– Stegner, Wallace, \u2018Discovery! The Story of Aramco Then\u2019, Saudi Aramco World<\/em>, March-April 969, vol. 20, no.2, pp. 10-21.<\/p>\n

– Traboulsi, Fawwaz, A History of Modern Lebanon<\/em>, London, Pluto Press, 2007.<\/p>\n

– Vitalis, Robert, America ‘s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, Stanford: <\/em>Stanford University Press, 2007.<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. See: Hassan Hallaq, Min Muzakkirat Salim `Ali Salam 1868-1938<\/em>, Beirut: Dar al-Jami`iyah, 1982. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  2. Amin al- Rihani, Tarikh Najd al-Hadith, <\/em>Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 2nd<\/sup>. Edition, 1954, pp. 357-387 \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  3. Unless otherwise mentioned, all information on `Uwayni is taken from his biography: Roger Gehchan, Hussein Aoueini, un demi-siecle d\u2019histoire du Liban et du Moyen-Orient (1920-19710<\/em>), Beyrouth: Editions FMA, 2000. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  4. See: Paul Lande, \u2018A King and a Concession\u2019, Saudi Aramco World,<\/em> May\/June 1984, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 4-9; Wallace Stegner, \u2018Discovery! The Story of Aramco Then\u2019, Saudi Aramco World<\/em>, March-April 969, vol. 20, no.2, pp. 10-21. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  5. See; General Spears Papers,<\/em> Saint Antony\u2019s College, Oxford, Box III\/3, telegram of 13 November 1943. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  6. Gehchan, p. 77. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  7. Gehchan, p. 77. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  8. Gehchan, p. 76 \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  9. \u2018The Political Control Exercised by the Commercial Class in Lebanon\u2019, Foreign Servcice of the United States of America<\/em> (FSOUSA),<\/em> dispatch no. 372, 21 January 1952, by Harold B. Minor. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  10. American Embassy, Beirut, to the Department of State, Washington, despatch No. 515, \u2018Beirut as a Gold Market\u2019, March 6, 1953, Foreign Service of the United States of America (FSOUSA)<\/em>, unclassified. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  11. \u2018The Political Control Exercised by the Commercial Class in Lebanon\u2019, Foreign Servcice Of the United States of America<\/em> (FSOUSA),<\/em> dispatch no. 372, 21 January 1952, by Harold B. Minor. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  12. The term was coined by the satirical journalist Iskandar Riyachi in his Al-Sahafi al-Ta\u2019ih<\/em>. Data on the Consortium has been computed from a variety of sources, both written and oral. Among them should be cited two reports by the Foreign Service of the United States of America (FSOUSA) Declassified Material: i) Lane to Department of State: Memorandum of an interview with Prime Minister of Lebanon prepared by the Commercial attache,<\/em> no. 1048, secret, Beirut, 17 December 1945; ii) The Political Control Exercised by the Commercial Class in Lebanon, <\/em>despatch no. 372, 21 January 1952, by Harold B. Minor. Minor\u2019s exceptional report is based on information supplied by a number of Lebanese and foreign businessmen, politicians and high state functionaries. It contains information on 25 members of the \u2018commercial class\u2019. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  13. Gehchan, pp. 67-68. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  14. See: Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon<\/em>, London, Pluto Press, 2007, pp.115-119. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  15. Khuri himself had confessed that the elections were rigged. See: Bishara al-Khuri<\/em>, Majmu`at Khutab, September 1943-December 1951<\/em>, Beirut, 1951. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  16. Gehcjane, pp. 175-176. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  17. See serialized Hurani\u2019s memoirs, \u2018Min Muzakkirat Akram al-Hurani\u2019, in Al-Sharq<\/em> al-Awsat<\/em>, 16 July 1997. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  18. According to Wilbor Eveland, ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, Miles Copeland, major CIA operative in the Middle East and Stephen Mead, assistant military attach\u00e9 at the US embassy in Damascus, were largely responsible for engineering Za`im\u2019s coup in order to drive Syria to sign the agreement with Tapline. See: Irene Gendzier\u2019s interview with Eveland in Notes From the Minefiled: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958<\/em>, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 98 and Douglas Little, \u2018Cold War and Covert Action: the United States and Syria, 1945-1958, Middle East Journal<\/em>, vol. 44, no. 1 (Winter 1990), p. 55. \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n
  19. Benoit-Mechin, cited in Gehchan, 178) \u2191<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Saudi expansion: The Lebanese Connection (1924-1952) Fawwaz Traboulsi Presented at the Conference \u2018Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Expansion in the World\u2019, King\u2019s College, University of London, 6-9 September 2007. Introduction Lebanon is the first Arab country to become the theater of the political and economic expansion of the emerging Saudi kingdom, with the exception of the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_wp_rev_ctl_limit":""},"categories":[],"content_type":[531],"themes":[316],"country":[337,2816],"language":[66],"archive_type":[113],"archive_author":[246],"media_type":[],"keywords":[647,889,904,934,1663,965,1047,1066,1077,1084,1088,1102,1683,1293,1341,1382,1396],"ft_dossier":[3379,3346,3355],"ft_categories":[],"published_in":[439],"class_list":["post-205","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","content_type-papers-en","themes-international-relations-en","country-lebanon-en","country-saudi-arabia-en","language-english","archive_type-by-ft-en","archive_author-fawwaz-traboulsi-en","keywords-arab-politics-en","keywords-french-mandate-en","keywords-geopolitics-en","keywords-hashemite-ambitions-en","keywords-history-kw-en","keywords-hussein-uwayni-en","keywords-lebanese-bourgeoisie-en","keywords-lebanese-independence-en","keywords-lebanese-oligarchy-en","keywords-lebanese-political-economy-en","keywords-lebanese-politics-en","keywords-lecture-en","keywords-migration-en","keywords-political-patronage-en","keywords-rafiq-hariri-en","keywords-saudi-arabia-kw-en","keywords-sectarianism-en","ft_dossier-empire-regional-order-en","ft_dossier-lebanon-war-en","ft_dossier-political-economy-justice-en","published_in-conference-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/205","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=205"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/205\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=205"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"content_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/content_type?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"themes","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/themes?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"language","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/language?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"archive_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/archive_type?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"archive_author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/archive_author?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"media_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media_type?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"keywords","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/keywords?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"ft_dossier","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ft_dossier?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"ft_categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ft_categories?post=205"},{"taxonomy":"published_in","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fawwaztraboulsi.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/published_in?post=205"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}